Abstract. The emergence of computing environments where smart devices are embedded pervasively in the physical world has made possible many interesting applications and has triggered several new research areas. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), sensor networks and radio frequency identification (RFID) systems are all examples of such pervasive systems.
Introduction and Motivation
We investigate the security of pervasive systems with focus on availability issues in the presence of Byzantine faults. Our goal is to specify formal simulation frameworks for analyzing security objectives and more importantly to design novel mechanisms and algorithms that achieve proven availability, uninterrupted services, high efficiency and low overhead in such systems. With a large amount of research already invested into other non-security issues, it is preferable whenever
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possible to design mechanisms that integrate security into existing algorithms that are well established in the literature.
The emergence of computing environments where smart devices are embedded pervasively in the physical world has made possible many interesting applications and triggered several new research areas. These include pervasive systems with constrained resources that intelligently configure and connect themselves, in particular, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), sensor networks and RFID systems. Nevertheless, the deployment of such systems in practice poses great challenges concerning their security and robustness in the presence of malicious faults. So far, research has focused on functionality, performance and services, with security being given a lower priority and centered mainly on confidentiality and integrity, but not availability (under malicious attacks). In particular, most research on network security and cryptography involves highly powered, highly structured redundant systems. For this reason the proposed security solutions are often inappropriate for these networks. This is particularly true regarding Denialof-Service (DoS) attacks against power constrained systems. Furthermore, most practical security patches are only for specific attacks, leaving an unjustified belief that proven security and efficiency are conflicting goals.
Overview of our results. We investigate secure mechanisms and protocols for ubiquitous systems. We consider two applications.
Secure Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET). In particular we:
-Develop a formal simulation framework for security that focuses on availability under DoS attacks, and that allows for concurrency and universal composability. -Investigate mechanisms that provably support availability in malicious environments within the formal simulation security framework. -Design protocols that provide message-delivery guarantees and that provably support network self-healing from malicious attacks. In particular, protocols that enable migration of the network to a fault-free state.
Secure Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). In particular we:
-Develop a formal simulation framework for security of RFID systems that models availability, privacy, and authenticity services, and -Design provably secure scalable anonymous authentication protocols for RFIDs in the formal framework.
Our approach is holistic and promotes self-healing. It provides for novel optimistic mechanisms that deal with security and availability issues in an efficient manner with low overhead. We focus on systems that will tolerate, trace and eliminate faults by reconfiguring. The threat model allows for a very powerful Byzantine adversary: malicious nodes are not bounded by the system specifications and can use covert channels, more powerful transmitters/receivers, responders etc. Security will be proven using a well established cryptographic framework. In contrast to traditional cryptographic solutions, our approach is suitable for low power, low cost devices in a malicious environments with no infrastructure.
A self-healing strategy for ubiquitous systems. Self-healing is achieved by tracing malicious behavior. Whenever a component exhibits non-system faulty behavior, a tracing mechanism is activated and the component isolated. Assuming the number of potential non-system faults is bounded (the Byzantine assumption), the system ultimately will be fault-free. By using low level (optimistic) mechanisms, there is no extra cost when the adversary is passive. Even when faults do occur, the overhead involved is small. This makes it possible to achieve our security goal with practical systems that have constrained resources.
Securing MANET Applications

A Formal Simulation Framework for Security
There are several ways to capture the unpredictable nature of a mobile ad hoc network. Whichever way is used, there are important mobility and medium aspects that must be reflected. In its simplest form, a mobile ad hoc network is a stochastic process
. . , where G t is a random graph with node set V , for which communication is: (i) synchronous, the time for a single transmission to be received is bounded by a constant; (ii) promiscuous, a packet transmitted by node will be received by all its neighbors. Links can be undirected (the neighbor relationship is symmetric) or directed (the neighbor relationship is asymmetric). We note that to the best of our knowledge, to date, all routing algorithms proposed in the literature support only bidirectional or undirected links.
The stochastic aspect of G is determined by the states of the nodes of G and Nature. Nature's contribution comes from the environment and the fact that the communication is wireless. A wide variety of factors may affect the communication, ranging from weather to radio interference and physical obstacles.
Adversary structure. In our model for the adversary, malicious nodes are not bounded by the constraints of the mobile ad hoc network. In particular, the adversary can send packets to arbitrary nodes and eavesdrop on all communication (not necessarily via nodes under his control). In this respect, our model differs from other models. Definition 1. Let Γ be a family of subsets V of the node set V . We call Γ an Adversary Structure [20] . The adversary A = A Γ selects a subset V ∈ Γ and can corrupt all its nodes during the lifetime of the system.
1 Adv controls the nodes of V and may use them to undermine the security of the network. We call these nodes corrupted or faulty and refer to Adv as a Γ -adversary. The 1 There are several generalizations of this model. One such generalization allows Γ to be dynamic: at regular intervals Adv can replace V by V ∈ Γ , that is, release the nodes of V \V and replace them by the nodes of V \V . Another generalization involves hybrid faults: malicious faults and physical faults. We shall not consider these models here. [36] for which Γ = {V ⊂ V | |V | ≤ k}, for some threshold k. In this case the adversary A = A k can control up to k nodes. We call A k a k-adversary.
Simulation framework. Our security simulation framework follows cryptographic paradigm for the security of network protocols [3] . Mobile nodes are probabilistic Turing machines with a special transceiver tape linked to a network oracle O G . For concurrent executions of distributed algorithms, we use a model with an infinite collection of oracles that emulate concurrent sessions of the algorithm, with which the adversary can interact. The following definition captures the basic security requirements of this approach for secure distributed applications. For a more formal discussion of a simulation framework for security, see Section 5.
Definition 2.
Let G be a mobile ad hoc network and π a distributed algorithm of G. The probabilities are taken over the adversary's and honest parties' coin tosses.
Security Issues for Routing Algorithms
Communication in an ad hoc network is achieved by forwarding packets via paths. Depending on where most of the routing effort takes place, there are two types of routing: network-centric and source-centric. With network-centric routing (such as DSDV [31] , WR [6] and AODV [32] ) the routing effort is distributed within the network; with source-centric routing (such as DSR [26] ) most of the routing effort is done by the source node. From a security point of view, network-centric routing requires substantial cooperation between network nodes and strong trust relationships. These algorithms are therefore more vulnerable to malicious faults. On the other hand, with source-centric routing, the source is less dependent on intermediate node cooperation and thus less vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Denial-of-Service attacks.
A DoS can be triggered in several ways, as for example by: (1) Flooding in dense networks; (2) Flooding irrelevant packets; (3) Packet dropping, e.g., on routers; (4) Preventing route discovery.
Man-in-the-Middle attacks. In a MiM attack the adversary takes control of the communication channel between the source and destination by interposing between them. Active MiM attacks include, for instance: (1) Wormhole attacks [25] ; (2) Rushing attacks [25] ; and (3) Sybil attacks [17] .
Security at the physical and data link layers. There are two types of faults that may occur in a routing algorithm: faults whose effect is stochastically indistinguishable from ordinary link failures caused by the mobility of the system, radio interference, power failure etc, and faults whose effect can be distinguished. Faults that do not deviate from ordinary failures are best dealt with at the physical or data link layer of the protocol stack with Medium Access Control protocols. At these layers one can also deal with jamming attacks (using frequency-hopping spread spectrum techniques) and most isolated DoS attacks.
Faults of the second type, although by definition statistically detectable, can be quite hard to trace or locate. They include malicious faults, which may occur when they are least expected, and may not be traceable with statistical failure analysis. The reason for this is that any analysis based on reported failures can be manipulated by the adversary. Faults of this type have to be addressed at higher levels.
Security issues of Ariadne, SEAD and SAODV.
Several routing protocols in the literature address security issues (see e.g., [30] ). Examples that are well established in the literature include: Ariadne [23] , SEAD [24] and Secure AODV [38] . These algorithms do not tolerate insider faults caused by packet dropping or by colluding nodes (on paths). In particular they do not tolerate wormhole attacks.
Tolerating DoS Attacks with cell grids and colored graphs.
A cell-grid approach -see Figure 1 ,is proposed in [8] in which only one node in each cell is only needed to propagate a packet. This approach guarantees packet delivery during DoS attacks including malicious DoS attacks. This result is based on circular broadcast ranges. It is possible to remove this restriction and extend the cell-grid approach to routing protocols (for example, by taking a succession of adjacent cells as a virtual path).
An Optimistic Algorithm That Traces Malicious Faults
Here we describe an optimistic algorithm that will trace malicious faults [9] . For this algorithm there is no additional cost when there are no faults. When faults do occur, the cost to locate a fault is one tracing round and two digital signatures (for a short probe and a short f ailreport). In either case, a packet is confirmed successfully delivered, or a fault location is determined with only two digital signatures. This is the most efficient routing algorithm that will trace malicious behavior even when faulty nodes collude. It improves on the tracing algorithm in [2] that requires at least log(n) communication rounds and signatures to locate a malicious fault, and that does not consider collusions. In our algorithm faults that can be dealt with at the data link layer by error correction and re-sending packets are treated as non-malicious. The protocol is described in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . The following notation is used: Destination d. When a valid pkts is received:
1. Construct and send ackd to prec(d).
Fig. 2. An optimistic tracing algorithm, I
Intermediate node x. When pkt sd is received: DSDV, AODV, and DSR , malicious faults will be traced by using the optimistic tracing algorithm for packet processing (the store-and-forward process). This can be done at the network layer, i.e., after error checking at the data link layer (MAC).
Adaptive Multipath Routing
In this section we propose to investigate secure distributed algorithms for finding maximal vertex disjoint paths that allow us to design secure AODV-type algorithms [32] .
Multipath routing involves the establishment of multiple paths between source and destination pairs. These paths may be used for redundant communication to control malicious attacks. A major advantage in using multipaths is that, by exploiting redundancy we can guarantee service continuity, even when the adversary is active.
An Adaptive Multipath Routing algorithm. Finding routes with multiple paths in networks that do not have a fixed infrastructure is a challenge and in general requires a different approach to that used with fixed infrastructures. An adaptive multipath routing algorithm that combines in parallel a distributed version of Ford-Fulkerson Max-Flow algorithm [18] (at the source) with a local network discovery algorithm (for nearby nodes) to find vertex-disjoint paths that link the source to the destination is proposed in [7] . This algorithm is proven secure in [9] . It is shown that: Theorem 2. The adaptive multipath routing algorithm in [9] tolerates any k-adversary, provided that the network graph is (k + 1)-connected, k ≥ 1.
The novelty of this algorithm is that it is resistant to malicious DoS attacks which are addressed adaptively. In particular, when there are no attacks a single route is used. With each malicious attack, the multipath is adaptively reconstructed to deal with the threat. Only the shortest route(s) is (are) actually used, while the rest are kept alive. Furthermore, communication is activated as soon as a path becomes available, so there are no unnecessary delays.
In general when faults in a t-multipath occur beyond a certain acceptable threshold, the source s will use a (t + 1)-multipath. Since the new set of paths is already constructed in the background, the delay caused by faults is minimized. Most of the time, there should be no delay. Furthermore, in our algorithm, the set of vertex-disjoint paths of the multipath is constructed incrementally, so that even when delays are unavoidable, they are minimal.
Observe that having local information available centrally is easier than having it distributed. In particular, the procedure used in the adaptive routing algorithm by the source allows more vertex-disjoint paths to be found than in most other multipath routing protocols. As a consequence fewer communication rounds may be needed when faults occur.
This algorithm can be can combined with the Dynamic Source Routing algorithm [26] to get an adaptive multipath DSR algorithm for reliability and service continuity in the presence of malicious adversary. Similarly, we may combine the adaptive multipath routing algorithm with the tracing mechanism to get an adaptive routing algorithm that will trace malicious behavior.
Securing RFID Applications
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs) were initially developed as very small electronic hardware components having as their main function to broadcast a unique identifying number upon request. The simplest types of RFIDs are passive tags, that do not contain a power source, and are incapable of autonomous activity. These devices are powered by the reader's radiowaves, and the antenna doubles as a source of inductive power. Active tags, on the other hand, contain a power source and transmitter, and are capable of autonomous communication. Examples of such tags are toll passes. The low cost and high convenience value of RFIDs give them a potential for massive deployment, and it is expected that they will soon outnumber all other computing device types. Consequently, RFIDs are increasingly used in applications that interface with information security functions.
RFIDs are a challenging platform from an information assurance standpoint. Their extremely limited computational capabilities imply that traditional techniques for securing communication protocols cannot be used with such devices, and instead that new, lightweight approaches must be considered. Yet the privacy and security requirements of RFID applications can be quite significant. Herein we describe measures for the provision of security and privacy that are feasible for RFID applications. Ultimately, this should be accomplished with as rigorous a view of security as other types of applications.
It is our goal is to design protocols for RFID applications that:
1. are provably secure under formal simulation frameworks that capture the behavior of honest and adversarial parties, and that articulate a comprehensive security view in terms of an ideal functionality. 2. explicitly consider the existence of side-channels, an issue often ignored in modelling security of traditional applications, but which can be critically important in the RFID context; and 3. are computationally lightweight, taking into consideration the hardwareimposed constraints of the medium.
History of a Provably Secure RFID Authentication Protocol
In order to illustrate the need for comprehensive security models for RFID applications, we consider variants of the HB protocol which have been proposed as a practical form of secure RFID authentication. Introduced in [22] , the HB protocol was originally designed for use by humans-who, as RFID tags, have limited ability to perform complex computations. In RFID tags, the HB protocol leverages the fact that generation of reasonably strong random numbers can be done cheaply by exploring physical properties-ultimately, exploiting the principle of little separation between hardware and software in the RFID domain. The HB protocol can be proven secure against passive adversaries in a nonconcurrent protocol execution setting by a simple reduction to the so-called "Learning Parity with Noise" (LPN) problem. However, it is completely insecure against an active adversary. To fix these problems, the HB protocol was adapted to include challenges from both readers and tags, leading to the HB+ protocol. Protocol HB+ can be proven secure against active adversaries [27] in a simplified model where the adversary is a malicious reader attacking a single honest tag. The proof has been generalized to a parallel and concurrent setting in [28] showing that rewinding techniques in the original security proof in [27] are not truly necessary; once re-winding is eliminated, one may claim as in [28] that multiple simulations can be executed simultaneously without exponential amplification of the probability of simulation failure, and therefore that the scheme is secure in the concurrent setting.
Both of the above security results are established in a simple attack model, which is not a multi-party model. They cannot be held as providing evidence that the scheme is secure in practical applications, where the adversary may communicate with both readers and tags simultaneously. Indeed, man-in-themiddle attacks do exist [19] and result in a total protocol break, as we now describe. In what follows, we denote bit vectors in boldface, and if v is a bit vector, by |v| we mean the Hamming weight (number of non-zero components) of v. If a and b are two bit vectors of length k, denote by a · b the value
where ⊕ denotes the XOR bit operation. Legitimate readers and tags share a pair of keys (x, y).
The attack works as follows: The attacker first chooses a k-bit string d at random and XORs it against the Reader's challenge a before forwarding it to the tag. Since the same value d is used in all protocol rounds until an outcome is produced by the Reader, it is easy to show that the authentication will be successful with overwhelming probability when d · x = 0-for in that case the responses by the Tag are the same as in the regular protocol. The opposite will be true when d · x = 1, i.e., the Reader will reject with overwhelming probability. The adversary has then learned one linear relation among the bits of x, and by repeating the attack with different values of d, the full value of x can be recovered. The adversary can also learn the key value y by performing a similar attack, where the value d is xored into the blinding factor b instead of into the challenge a.
The attack illustrates the fact that security proofs, when carried out in an overly simplified attack model, fail to convey implications for the practical security of protocols. The above example-cum-moral-lesson-tale is a compelling one from the realm of recent RFID protocols, but the basic premise that protocol analysis should ideally be carried out within a comprehensive attack model has been well recognized-e.g., see [11] for general arguments in this regard.
There exist competing approaches for analyzing the security of protocols against arbitrary adversarial configurations. Some of these have been successful at other areas of computer science and adapted for the purposes of security analysis, such as techniques based on model-checking, and formal methods. We will take the approach of indistinguishability between real and ideal protocol simulations. This formalism is based on the premise that one should first define an ideal functionality for the protocol-i.e., how to achieve security in an ideal world where the honest parties have a secure communication channel to a trusted party. Then, one constructs a reduction that maps real protocol runs to protocol runs in the ideal world, and shows that honest parties cannot distinguish real and ideal protocol executions. The above formulation was introduced by Beaver [5, 3, 4] , and extended by Canetti as the universal composability framework [10, 11, 12] . It has also been ported to a modular, formal models-type approach called reactive systems, which emphasizes independent analysis of cryptography and communication layers, by Pfitzmann and Waidner [33, 34] .
Formal modelling of protocols and cryptographic primitives via real vs. ideal simulations is an increasingly respected paradigm for the analysis of multi-party protocols, including authentication and key-exchange [15, 21, 14] , zero-knowledge proofs [13, 16] , and the universe of cryptographic primitives [29] . More recently, an RFID privacy-oriented protocol has been proven secure in a strong real/ideal setting [1] . In Section 5, we introduce a first attempt at a comprehensive security model for RFID applications. We demonstrate that the man-in-the-middle attack to the HB+ protocol is captured in our model and therefore, that HB+ cannot be proven secure in that model. We also argue that the model is a reasonable framework to study the real-world security of RFID applications.
Towards Practical Secure Anonymous RFID Authentication
An RFID authentication system has three components: tags T , readers R, and a trusted server S. Tags are wireless transponders: they have no power of their own and respond only when they are in an electromagnetic field. Readers are transceivers and generate such fields, which they use to transmit challenges to tags (via wireless broadcast). There are two types of challenges: multicast and unicast. Multicast challenges are addressed to all tags in the range of a reader, whereas unicast challenges are addressed to specific tags. In our protocols below we consider both types of challenges. However, our multicast challenges are just random strings, and all tags in the range of a reader R are challenged with the same random string. This kind of action is not usually counted as a communication pass in an authentication protocol.
We shall assume that all honest tags T adhere to the system specifications and the requirements of the authentication protocol. The same applies to the honest readers R, and to the trusted server S. Tags are issued with individual private keys K which they share only with the trusted server S. These keys are used by the tags for authentication. We denote by K the set of all authorized keys (issued by S).
In our RFID authentication protocols we shall assume that honest readers R and the server S are linked by a secure communication channel (reliable and authenticated).
A Provably Secure 1-Pass Optimistic Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol
In Figure 4 we describe a one-pass protocol that authenticates RFID tags anonymously, and that is optimistic, in the sense that when the adversary is not active the cost to both the tag and the server is minimized. In this protocol, each reader R broadcasts a random string r sys obtained from the server S, and updated at regular intervals. All the tags in the range of R use the same r sys , but will combine it with a locally generated string r tag , and send (broadcast) to the reader R the MAC: h = H K (r sys , r tag ). Here H K (·) is a keyed hash H(K, ·). T computes the value of local string r tag by taking the MAC of its previous value, stored locally. The server also updates the value r K in a local key look-table -see Figure 5 . From this table, and the value r tag sent by T , the server can find a corresponding key K and check that the value h is that same as H K (r sys , r tag ). If the tag T has not been challenged by an unauthorised reader, the value h will be correct. In this case the cost for both the tag and the server is two MACs. However, if the tag has recently interacted with a malicious reader, the stored values will be R broadcasts rsys
T → R → S : rtag, h = HK(rsys, rtag) T updates rtag = HK(rtag)
S accepts T if: HK(rsys, rtag) .
S updates rK = HK(rtag) in the look-up table L. Fig. 4 . A one-pass anonymous RFID authentication protocol. Figure 5 shows the lookup table L. out-of-sync. Then the server will have to exhaustively search through all keys k ∈ K to find the correct value and resynchronize. Note that in the dishonest case the extra computational cost is borne out by the server and not by the tag. By exploiting the higher computational capabilities of the trusted server, we have designed a strong authentication protocol that provably hides the identity of tags from eavesdroppers and malicious readers without requiring the tag to ever perform expensive public-key operations. In all cases, the tag only needs to compute two MACs to authenticate itself. In the honest case, this is also the protocol cost for the central server.
Theorem 3 ([9]). The 1-pass optimistic anonymous protocol is available, anonymous and secure in the security framework defined below (Section 5).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only anonymous, strong RFID authentication protocol that is also amenable to being proven secure within a comprehensive adversarial model, which we describe in the next section.
In the following section we formalize the security definitions for RFID protocols. The model largely follows existing paradigms for security of general-purpose network protocols, but becomes specific to the context of RFID applications in two aspects. First, we consider availability explicitly, capturing security against unauthorized disabling of tags directly within the model. Secondly, we restrict concurrency by prohibiting tags from executing more than one session at a time. Note that this is a restriction only on individual, honest tags-many honest tags can be executing concurrently. In addition, readers (whether honest or corrupt), the central server, and dishonest tags can execute multiple sessions simultaneously. Yet, the requirement that a single honest tag can participate only in one session at a time facilitates the design of concurrently secure protocols. As the restriction is a mild one, and in accordance with the capabilities of RFID technology, it is beneficial in that it enables designers of security protocols to concentrate on the crucial security aspects and on how to balance competing interests, such as requirements of low computational cost and low memory utilization.
Proof structure. The proof (omitted here) consists of two stages. First, security is shown in an idealized protocol model, wherein honest parties have access to a trusted party (ideal functionality). Security in this ideal world can be readily seen to follow from the behavior of the ideal functionality in simulations. It is then shown that the environment cannot distinguish between real and ideal world simulations. The adversary is allowed to schedule the actions of honest parties, eavesdrop in communications, and interact with the environment in an arbitrary manner (Byzantine adversary).
Security Simulation
Initialization of honest parties. Honest parties are initialized as follows. The trusted server-symbolized by oracle O S -creates a database of keys K i , i = 1, . . . , n-choosing keys at random from {0, 1} τ , where τ is a security parameter (provided as input to the initialization step). For simplicity, we do not consider dynamic corruption of tags here. Instead, the adversary is initialized with a subset of the valid keys K +1 , . . . , K n , and so the first keys correspond to honest tags. During real-world simulations, the adversary interacts with honest tag T i by accessing oracle O i , which emulates the behavior of the honest tag with corresponding key K i .
The initialization also requires, for each ordered pair (i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ , that one chooses two bits b Real simulation model. Let A be the adversary. A can internally represent many adversarial tags T (with compromised valid keys or invalid keys) and dishonest readers R , but we represent it as a single party A.
At the beginning of the simulation, the total number of tags n is provided to the adversary. The adversary interacts in an arbitrary manner with the simulation environment Z. Consider a single communication session between A and some honest party. Z maintains a notion of time-we do not require synchronized clocks, Z only needs to discern which adversarial actions precede other adversarial actions. and O 2 i∨j represent the same or different identities. Note that the concurrencyprevention rules (enforced via the tags maintaining a status among available, communicating, and unavailable) are designed to prevent that A may disambiguate the ambivalent oracles simply on the basis of availability conflicts, while at the same time preventing that a single tag executes two sessions concurrently.
Security Definitions
We now formally define the security goals of anonymous authentication protocols. We define a session ses with honest tag T i as a time-interval between the first call to START(i) after either the beginning of the simulation or the most recent call to END(i), and the first subsequent call to END(i).
Availability: holds when there is no efficient adversary A that during the course of the simulation, has non-negligible probability in preventing a tag T i from authenticating itself to a reader R j during a session ses, without changing T i 's interaction with R j in session ses. This should remain true even if A has interacted with T i or T S arbitrarily in the past, perhaps attempting to force either or both into an inconsistent state. Note that A is still allowed to interact with all other honesty parties, including reader R j , during ses. The advantage adv A,Ti AV LB of A in this game against T i is the maximum probability that T S rejects T i in any session. An important concern in regard to the management of RFIDs is to have a kill process, in which a reader can instruct an RFID tag to disable its functionality permanently. Current methods for disabling EPC tags have been recently shown ( [35] ) to allow an attacker to perform a power-analysis based recovery of the kill-key. Such attacks violate the above definition of availability. Our protocols can be adapted to support a kill-key while still guaranteeing availability.
Authentication: holds when there is no efficient adversary that, during the simulation, succeeds with non-negligible probability in authenticating itself to an honest reader R j during some session ses, and moreover: (a) The server T S believes A to have authenticated itself as tag T i in ses; and (b) the duration interval [start-time, end-time] for session ses is disjoint from the duration intervals of all of A's sessions with oracle O i as well as with any ambivalent oracle O c i,j that was initialized as O i . We note that in this definition, A is not required to know under which identity T i it has succeeded in authenticating itself. Furthermore, it accommodates man-in-the-middle attacks, as long as the attack leads to A's acquiring knowledge (such as keys) that can be used for subsequent authentication attempts, while ruling out scenarios in which the adversary simply relays messages between honest parties as successful attacks. The advantage adv
A,Ti
AUTH of the adversary against authentication is simply the probability that it succeeds. This is a unified framework because the adversary does not need to identify, at any particular point in the simulation, which security property it seeks to defeat. Instead, it may weigh its knowledge and adjust its strategy during the simulation to maximize its success in violating any of the security requirements.
